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Saudi Arabia's new monarch, King Salman, was quick to assure his subjects and allies that his ascent to the throne Friday would mean no change to the foreign policies adopted by his predecessor King Abdullah.

That may not be welcome news to everyone, however, because what the new king has inherited is a mess.

In Syria, King Abdullah had sought to help Sunni rebels overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad and to put an end to Iranian influence in the country. The jihadist revolution he spawned, however, got out of hand and now Saudi military aircraft are having to attack Islamic State fighters in a so-far futile effort to rein in the group. One of King Salman's own sons, Prince Khaled, is a fighter pilot and led the first Royal Saudi Air Force mission against IS targets in Syria in 2014.

In Iraq, Saudi policy had been to promote the empowerment of Sunnis in the face of Shia oppression. But the result was to encourage an Islamic State invasion that captured much of the territory in the country's Sunni provinces, and led to an ongoing war that has no end in sight.

Worse for the Saudis, their effort to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq backfired. If Islamic State is defeated in Iraq, it most likely will be at the hands of Iraqi Shiites and Kurdish fighters backed by Iran. The result of which will be to increase Iranian influence in the country.

In neighbouring Yemen, the Saudis tried repeatedly to suppress uprisings by Houthi rebels and to kick start a new government in Sanaa, only to have the Iranian-backed Houthis take control of the capital and oust the elected president. With no one in charge in the country at the moment the beneficiary may be al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, which has become al-Qaeda's most dangerous affiliate, says Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

The Saudis better watch out, he says. "Fresh from its attack in Paris … AQAP is dedicated to overthrowing the House of Saud."

On all these fronts, as in neighbouring Bahrain, Saudi Arabia has been acting out of fear of Iran's growing influence in the region. While the West may view Islamic State terror as its greatest regional threat, for the Saudis it is Iran they fear most.

Infuriating for King Abdullah was the fact that even as the Saudis were trying to ward off Iran, U.S. President Barack Obama was attempting to negotiate a rapprochement with Tehran, one that would allow Iran to retain a certain capacity for nuclear power, something Saudi Arabia believes would be used to create nuclear weapons.

It is noteworthy that the one country with which the House of Saud can see eye to eye on many of these matters is Israel.

The two countries have several common interests – both hold Iran in contempt and want to see it restrained and fully nuclear-free; both need U.S. support, but neither likes the current U.S. administration, and both want to see a strongman, such as Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, in power in Egypt.

King Abdullah felt strongly enough about Israel's utility to the region that he tried to entice the country into a comprehensive peace agreement with the Arab world. He was disappointed when Israel declined to take up the offer. It remains to be seen if King Salman, considered a more devout Muslim, will float a similar peace offer to the Jewish state.

King Salman also is inheriting a Saudi plan to reopen an embassy in Baghdad, 25 years after it closed its last one, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

The Saudis have become increasingly concerned about what they see as "the Iranian infiltration of Iraq," says Abdulrahman al-Rashed, the former general manager of the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya News Channel. Iran is attempting "to subjugate Iraq to its military and intelligence influence under the excuse of fighting terrorism," he wrote Friday in al Monitor.

An embassy will reportedly make it easier for the Saudis to influence people on the ground. Their usual recipe is to pour in money to help local fighters, in this case perhaps Sunni fighters willing to battle IS terrorists and make it unnecessary for Iran to assist in the fighting.

King Salman has experience with this model. He was the Saudi point man who oversaw the collection of private funds to support the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s, says Mr. Riedel, a former CIA analyst. Working closely with the kingdom's Wahhabi clerical establishment, "this private Saudi funding was critical to the war effort," he said. "At the war's peak, Salman was providing $25– million a month to the mujahideen."

In Iraq, however, a similar Saudi intervention to aid the Sunnis may simply be pouring fuel on the fire.

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