National-security intelligence is bogged down in an amateur-hour paper chase

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If you want your government officials to be on the ball when it comes to foreign interference, it might help if they could make a list, within a matter of months, of who should get a report drafted specifically for the prime minister.

There was a report like that – an overview of the strategy and tactics used by China to influence or interfere with political actors. On March 9, 2023, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service completed a redrafted version, specifically for the eyes of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Eight months later, it still hadn’t been shown to the PM, because the list of recipients hadn’t been approved.

There’s a lot of that kind of thing in the report released this week by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA).

Intelligence on foreign interference was collected, for sure. But then there was disagreement about how it should be reported, whether it should be reported, who should get it or how it should be read.

National-security intelligence was bogged down in an amateur-hour paper-chase.

This is a system crying out for co-ordination. That’s the prime minister’s job.

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NSIRA was created in 2019 as a successor to two previous bodies tasked with keeping an eye on the two main intelligence bodies – CSIS, the spy service, and the Communications Security Establishment, responsible for electronic snooping. But there are other agencies involved in intelligence, including arms of Global Affairs Canada and the Privy Council Office, the central government department that reports to the prime minister. There are senior civil servants, including the prime minister’s national security and intelligence adviser, making decisions about what the PM sees.

What’s not clear is how they work together to disseminate intelligence.

When CSIS thought they were alerting the top dogs to Chinese-government interference in Canadian politics, the national security and intelligence adviser once told them it was standard diplomatic activity by foreign envoys. There were several instances where readers of intelligence reports did not grasp their “intended import,” which makes you wonder how they are written. There wasn’t proper tracking of who read reports.

And NSIRA politely noted government officials might want to pay attention, by saying “there must be interest on the part of consumers for the intelligence they receive.” You have to think that should start with Mr. Trudeau. He should be doing something about it by ensuring proper organization of how intelligence is assessed and shared.

Instead, NSIRA’s report suggests intelligence reports regularly don’t make it to key readers. Except by mistake.

One example was that report the Prime Minister never read. It started out, according to NSIRA, as something called the “Targeting Paper,” which was written by a CSIS analyst combining electronic and traditional intelligence into an overview of Beijing’s strategy and tactics in influencing or interfering with political actors.

It was completed in June, 2021, but not disseminated around government. CSIS told NSIRA there were a variety of reasons, from COVID-19 and “logistical challenges” related to classified material, staff turnover, legal issues, “and the overall sensitivity of the material.”

More than a year later, the author of the report asked why it hadn’t been disseminated, and CSIS, after a few more months, sent it out to senior officials. Nine days later, the national security and intelligence adviser asked CSIS to claw it back – but in the meantime, it had been read by 40 officials.

There was a conflict about what it meant: The national security and intelligence adviser argued the report didn’t cover interference, but standard diplomatic work. CSIS, according to NSIRA, saw it as “the most complete and detailed analysis of [China’s] foreign interference directed against Canadian political actors.”

The Prime Minister never saw it. A shorter version was drafted for him, but CSIS director David Vigneault never approved a distribution list. The national security and intelligence adviser never followed up, so the PM never saw it.

If that was a one-off, it would be concerning. But NSIRA’s report places it in a larger pattern. Disagreements, sensitivities, a lack of clear policy direction – all got in the way.

That’s up to the Prime Minister to fix. Wesley Wark, a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, said that in other countries, such as Britain and Australia, there is a co-ordinating security body at the centre of government that emphasizes high-quality assessments of intelligence. At the very least, Canada’s intelligence community needs to be organized.